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Phillips: "New" Rights for Handicapped Newborns: Baby Doe and Beyond

"New" Rights for Handicapped Newborns: Baby
Doe and Beyond
INTRODUCTION

"[P]arents wouldn't be killing their own baby if it weren't for the
baby's own good."' The article over which that caption appears is
part of the recent national debate concerning withholding food and
medical treatment from handicapped infants. The emotional issues
involved have pitted the Reagan administration, championing the
rights of the handicapped, against almost the entire medical
community.
Public and governmental concern culminated in the passage of
the "Child Abuse Amendments of 1984" [hereinafter referred to as
Amendments]. 2 The Amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment Act 3 were signed into law on October 9, 1984 by
President Reagan. Under the Amendments, states are required to
adopt procedures that allow child protective service agencies to
"pursue any legal remedies, including the authority to initiate legal
proceedings. . . as may be necessary to prevent the withholding of
medically indicated treatment from disabled infants with life-threatening conditions." '4 Further, the definition of child abuse is expanded to include medical neglect.5 The only situations not
included in that definition are those when, in the treating physicians
"reasonable medical judgment," the infant is irreversibly comatose
or the treatment would merely prolong dying, be ineffective, futile
6
or inhumane.
The purpose of this Comment is to focus on .the rights of the
parents and infant when non-treatment decisions are made, as well
as to explore the perceptions of the medical community concerning
those rights.
I.

GETTING THE PUBLIC'S\ATTENTION

The difficult decision whether to save handicapped infants has
1. The Village Voice, Nov. 13, 1984, at 8, col. 2.
2. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98457, § 101, 98 Stat. 1749
(1984) (to be codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-06).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-06 (1982).
4. U.S. Code Cong. Ad. News (98 Stat.) 1749, 1752-53 (to be codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 5103).

5. Id. at 1752.
6. Id.
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been an issue in the medical community for many years. 7 Recently,
modem medicine has enabled doctors to save infants who in previous times were considered hopeless.8 However, the practice of euthanasia in the nursery rooms has continued on a "relatively large
scale without much public notice or concern because it [is] typically
a 'low visibility' physician's decision." 9 Such practices are obscured
from the public's view because "[o]nly the health professionals involved [know] of the decision not to treat, and they [are] all in
agreement with the practice. . . . 'Doctors have long withheld lifesaving medical support from grossly malformed infants, allowing
them to die at birth and often only telling the parents that their
babies were stillborn.' "10
In the early 1970's, media attention was focused on two incidences of non-treatment at Johns Hopkins University Hospital.
One of these was reported in the Washington Post as follows:
For fifteen days-until he starved to death-the newborn infant lay in a bassinet in a back corner of the nursery at the Johns
Hopkins University Hospital. A sign said "Nothing by mouth."
The baby's life could have been saved by a simple operation to
correct the intestinal blockage that kept him from digesting any
food.
But because he was born a mongoloid, the parents refused to
give the hospital permission to operate. And without that permission, the doctors said they had no legal right to perform the
operation. I
In 1972, the second incident at Johns Hopkins came to light, this
time involving a child born with Down's syndrome.1 2 The child
suffered from an intestinal blockage and the parents refused to consent to corrective surgery.1 3 Doctors at the hospital unsuccessfully
14
sought a court order permitting them to perform the surgery.
"Thereafter, all supportive therapy, including intravenous feeding,
7. Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides?, 7 AM. J.L. MED. 393, 398
(1982).
8. Id.

9. Id.
10. Id.; see also Time, Mar. 25, 1974, at 84.
11. Ellis, supra note 7, at 399. See also Washington Post, Oct. 15, 1971, at Al, col.
1.
12. Down's syndrome is reported by Ellis to be a:
[C]ondition [of] chromosomal abnormality producing mental retardation of
various degrees. The mental retardation can be severe .... Often.. .it is
accompanied by serious heart and bowel defects that mandate surgical intervention to avoid the death of the neonate. If surgical measures are taken,
newborns with Down's Syndrome accompanied by heart defects or bowel obstructions have life expectancies slightly shorter than normal (40-60 years).
Ellis, supra note 7, at 396.
13. Ellis, supra note 7, at 400.
14. Id.
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was discontinued and the infant eventually succumbed to dehydration." 15 This second incident provided an impetus to form a "God
Committee" at Johns Hopkins to review the treatment decisions in
similar cases. 16 Such cases, while capturing the public spotlight,
were not rare at the time. The physician in charge of the first incident mentioned above was reported to have stated that " '[s]imilar
life and death decisions are made at least twice a week at the
hospital.' ",17
Open acknowledgment that selective non-treatment decisions
were being made by the medical community occurred in 1973. Duff
and Campbell reported in the New England Journal of Medicine
that:
After careful consideration of each of these 43 infants, parents
and physicians in a group decision concluded that prognosis for
meaningful life was extremely poor or hopeless, and therefore rejected further treatment. The awesome finality of these decisions, combined with a potential for error in prognosis, made the
choice agonizing for families and health professionals. 18
Public attention next focused on the issue in 1975-76. This time
the issue was not framed in terms of non-treatment of a newborn,
rather it was framed in terms of the right to die. At the center of
the case was Karen Ann Quinlan. 19 On April 15, 1975, Karen
20
Quinlan stopped breathing for at least two fifteen-minute periods.
21
She was taken to the hospital in a comatose condition. A physician who examined her stated that she was in a" 'chronic persistent

vegetative state.'

"22

Karen's father, Joseph Quinlan, sought to be appointed as his
daughter's guardian with the express power to authorize the discontinuance of "all extraordinary medical procedures . . . sustaining
Karen's vital processes and hence her life." 2 3 The New Jersey
Supreme Court pointed out that although Karen was "irreversibly
doomed to [be] no more than a biologically vegetative remnant of
life," 24 she still had a constitutional right of privacy to25 personally
decide upon continuance of the life-support apparatus.
Indeed, the medical community was opposed to the removal of
Id.
Id.
Id. at 399.
Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-CareNursery,
289 N. ENGL. J. MED. 890 (1973).
15.
16.
17.
18.

19. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).

20. Id. at 23, 355 A.2d at 653-54.
21. Id. at 23, 355 A.2d at 654.
22. Id. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654.

23. Id. at 18, 355 A.2d at 651.
24. Id. at 38, 355 A.2d at 662.

25. Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
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the respirator sustaining Karen's life. Specifically, although the
doctors and medical experts testified that Karen retained only a
vegetative function of her brain, 26 they noted that the presence of a
vegetative function meant that the brain was not biologically dead,
according to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard

Medical School.27

In addressing the issue of Karen's right to privacy, the court

stated:
We have no doubt, in these unhappy circumstances, that if
Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval (not alter26. Id. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654.
We have an internal vegetative regulation which controls body temperature
which controls breathing, which controls to a considerable degree blood pressure, which controls to some degree heart rate, which controls chewing, swallowing and which controls sleeping and waking. We have a more highly
developed brain which is uniquely human which controls our relation to the
outside world, our capacity to talk, to see, to feel, to sing, to think. Brain
death necessarily must mean the death of both of these functions of the brain,
vegetative and the sapient. Therefore, the presence of any function which is
regulated or governed or controlled by the deeper parts of the brain which in
laymen's terms might be considered purely vegetative would mean that the
brain is not biologically dead.
Id.
27. Id. at 27, 355 A.2d at 656. The court, partially quoting the 1968 report of the
Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School, noted that:
From ancient times down to the recent past it was clear that, when the
respiration and heart stopped, the brain would die in a few minutes; so
the obvious criterion of no heart beat as synonymous with death was
sufficiently accurate. In those times the heart was considered to be the
central organ of the body; it is not surprising that its failure marked the
onset of death. This is no longer valid when modern resuscitative and
supportive measures are used. These improved activities can now restore "life" as judged by the ancient standards of persistent respiration
and continuing heart beat. This can be the case even when there is not
the remotest possibility of an individual recovering consciousness following massive brain damage. ["A Definition of Irreversible Coma,"
205 J. A. M. A. 337, 339 (1968)].
The Ad Hoc standards, carefully delineated, included absence of response
to pain or other stimuli, pupilary reflexes, corneal, pharyngeal and other reflexes, blood pressure, spontaneous respiration, as well as "flat" or isoelectric
electroencephalograms and the like, with all tests repeated "at least 24 hours
later with no change." In such circumstances, where all of such criteria have
been met as showing "brain death," the Committee recommends with regard
to the respirator:
The patient's condition can be determined only by a physician.
When the patient is hopelessly damaged as defined above, the family
and all colleagues who have participated in major decisions concerning
the patient, and all nurses involved, should be so informed. Death is to
be declared and then the respirator turned off. The decision to do this
and the responsibility for it are to be taken by the physician-in-charge,
in consultation with one or more physicians who have been directly
involved in the case. It is unsound and undesirable to force the family
to make the decision. [205 J. A. M. A., supra at 338 (emphasis in
original)].
Id. at 27-28, 355 A.2d at 656-57.
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ing the existing prognosis of the condition to which she would
soon return) and perceptive of her irreversible condition, she
could effectively decide upon the discontinuance of the life-sup28
port apparatus, even if it meant the prospect of natural death.
The court countered the state's claim that it had an overriding
interest in the preservation of life by noting that Karen's situation
differed from others for whom medical treatment had been ordered.
The court explained that those cases involved a minimal bodily invasion and the chances of recovery were very good. Karen's condition, on the other hand, required a great bodily invasion and her
prognosis was poor. In the latter case, the court reasoned, the
state's interest "weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows
as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.
Ultimately, there comes a point at which the individual's rights
29
overcome the State interest."
As such, the court stated that it had no hesitancy in deciding
"that no external compelling interest of the State could compel
Karen to endure the unendurable, only to vegetate a few measurable months with no realistic possibility of returning to any sem'30
blance of cognitive or sapient life."
The court then discussed the major constitutional cases dealing
with the right to privacy. 31 Relying on Roe v. Wade,32 the court
stated that "[p]resumably this right is broad enough to encompass a
patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances, in much the same way as it is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain
33
conditions."
Thus affirming Karen's independent right of choice, the court
next considered whether Joseph Quinlan could assert his daughter's
right of privacy. It stated:
Our affirmation of Karen's independent right of choice, however, would ordinarily be based upon her competency to assert it.
The sad truth, however, is that she is grossly incompetent and we
cannot discern her supposed choice based on the testimony of her
previous conversations with friends, where such testimony is
without sufficient probative weight. 137 NJ. Super. at 260.
Nevertheless we have concluded that Karen's right of privacy
28. Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
29. Id. at 40-41, 355 A.2d at 664-65.
30. Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
31. See, eg., Eisendstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973)).
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may be asserted on her behalf by her guardian under the peculiar
circumstances here present.
* * *The only practical way to prevent destruction of the right
is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to render their best
judgment, subject to the qualifications hereinafter stated,
as to
34
whether she would exercise it in these circumstances.
In regard to Joseph Quinlan's right of privacy in the matter, the
court determined that there was no parental constitutional right on

which to base the power to discontinue the respirator. 35 The only
cases recognizing parental rights of privacy have, the court noted,
'36
dealt with the rearing of children and "continuing life styles."

Following the Quinlan case, a number of states enacted "Natural
Death Acts."137 These acts allowed a person to sign a declaration
stating that life sustaining measures should not be taken in case of
terminal illness. They did not, however, deal with the termination
of food or life support of a newborn infant. In April of 1982, that
issue was once again brought to the attention of the American
public.
A baby boy born in Bloomington, Indiana, became known to the

outside world as Baby Doe. 38 The infant was born with Down's
syndrome and a tracheoesophageal fistula. 39 This blockage of his

digestive tract precluded normal feeding. 4° It was, however, surgically correctable. 4 1 Physicians at the hospital presented the parents
of the infant with two treatment options, either: (1) begin intrave-

nous feedings and prepare for possible surgical repair of the esopha34. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
35. Id. at 42, 355 A.2d at 664.
36. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 42, 355 A.2d at 664 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923)).
37. See ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1-10 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801-04 (Supp.
1983); CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (Deering 1985); DEL CODE
ANN. tit. 16 §§ 2501.08 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2401 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE
§§ 39-4501.08 (Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101-09 (1980); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 449.540-90 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1-11 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 90-320-22 (Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050-90 (1983); TEx. CIV. CODE
ANN. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-62 (Supp. 1984);
VA. CODE §§ 54-325.8:1-12 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-905
(Supp. 1985).
38. In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-00 (Cir. Ct. Monroe County, Ind. Apr. 12,
1982), writ ofmandamus dismissed sub. nom., Indiana ex rel. Infant Doe v. Baker, No.
482-S-140 (Ind. May 27, 1982) (case mooted by child's death). The court records have
been sealed in this case. Much of the information available comes from medical
sources.

39. Pless, The Story of Baby Doe, 309 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 664 (1983). The term
tracheoesophageal fistula is defined as a "congenital abnormality involving a communication between the trachea and esophagus; often associated with esophageal atresia ....
" STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 536 (5th ed. 1982).
40. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 397 (1983).
41. Id.
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gus, or (2) do nothing but provide palliative care. 42 The parents
refused to authorize surgery and the child was not fed intravenously. 43 Rather, the child was placed on phenobarbital and morphine, as needed, for pain and restlessness. 44
Hospital administrators, once they learned of the decision, became concerned about civil and criminal liability. On April 10,
1982, the hospital administrators requested that a state court judge
review the legality of the parents' and physicians' decision. 45 The
judge decided that there were no legal ramifications regarding the
decision not to treat or feed the infant. 46 Nevertheless, on April 13,
the judge appointed a private guardian for Baby Doe. 47
The first action taken by Baby Doe's guardian and the local prosecutor was the filing of two motions in the Monroe County Circuit
Court, which asked the court to order treatment of Baby Doe and
to remove him from the custody of his parents based on their decision not to feed or treat him. 48 The court ruled that the parents had
not abandoned the child and denied both motions. 49 Rather, the
court held that the parents had simply chosen one alternate form of
treatment over another.5 0 A writ of mandamus was filed in the Indiana Supreme Court the following day.5 1 The writ was denied for
"purely procedural reasons."15 2
In the interim, a Canadian teacher and an Indiana couple had
offered to adopt the child.5 3 On April 15, the couple sought to intervene in the proceedings as potential adoptive parents and asked
the court to order hydration and nutrition for the infant. 54 Once
again, the court ruled that the parents had not abandoned the child
and that they had shown "parental interest" by choosing the form
55
of treatment he was receiving.
The next step came the same day, when the county prosecutor
announced that an attorney from his office was being sent to Washington with an emergency request to the United States Supreme
42. Rothenberg, Down's Syndrome Babies: Decisions Not to Feed and the Letter
From Washington, 1 PULMINARY MED. & TECH. 47, 49 (1984).

43. Pless, supra note 39, at 664.
44. Id.
45. Rothenberg, supra note 42, at 49; see also supra note 38.

46. Id.
47. Id.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Court to overturn the Indiana courts' decisions.5 6 The question became moot when, at 10:03 p.m. that day, the hospital announced
the death of Baby Doe. 57 The death of Baby Doe set in motion a
series of federal government responses that culminated in the Child
Abuse Amendments of 1984.58
II.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONDS

A great deal of public attention was focused on the case of Baby
Doe. On April 30, 1982, President Reagan issued a directive to the
Department of Health and Human Services [hereinafter referred to
as HHS].5 9 The directive began, "'[t]he recent death of a handicapped newborn child in Indiana. . . raised the question whether
federal laws protecting the rights of handicapped citizens are being
adequately enforced.' "6 The directive also instructed the Secretary of HHS to:
[N]otify health care providers of the applicability of section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to the treatment of handicapped patients. That law forbids recipients of federal funds
from withholding from handicapped citizens, simply because
they are handicapped, any benefit or service that would ordinarily be provided to persons without handicaps. Regulations
under this law specifically prohibit hospitals and other providers
of health services receiving federal assistance from discriminating
against the handicapped.
Our nation's commitment to equal protection of the law will
have little meaning if we deny such protections to those who
have not been blessed with the same physical or mental gifts we
too often take for granted. I support federal laws prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped, and6 1remain determined
that such laws will be vigorously enforced.
Consequently, on May 18, 1982, the HHS's Civil Rights office
issued a notice to health care providers. 62 The notice repeated the
heightened public concern about the medical care for infants born
with birth defects. 63 It pointed out that "[r]eports suggest that operable defects have sometimes not been treated, and instead infants
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 2.
59. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap; Procedures and Guidelines Relating to Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 49 Fed. Reg. 1622 (1984) [the Department of Health and Human Services is hereinafter referred to as HHS].
60. Rothenberg, supra note 42, at 50.
61. 49 Fed. Reg. 1622-23 (1984).
62. Discriminating Against the Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or Nourishment; Notice of Health Care Providers, 47 Fed. Reg. 26027 (1982).
63. Id.
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have been allowed to die." 64 The notice continued by reminding
parties of the applicability of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973.65 The notice stated that:
[I]t is unlawful for a recipient of Federal financial assistance to
withhold from a handicapped infant nutritional sustenance or
medical or surgical treatment required to correct a life-threatening condition, if:
(1) The withholding is based on the fact that the infant is
handicapped; and

treatment or nutritional
(2) The handicap does not render the
66

sustenance medically contraindicated.

HHS recognized that health care providers may not have full
67
control over the infant when parental consent has been refused.
"Nevertheless," the agency stated, "a recipient may not aid or perthe discriminatory
petuate discrimination by significantly assisting
'6 8
actions of another person or organization.
The notice directed hospitals to review their conduct in the following areas to ensure that they were not engaging in discriminatory practices:
Counseling of parents should not discriminate by encouraging
them to make decisions which, if made by the health care provider, would be discriminatory under section 504.
Health care providers should not aid a decision by the infant's
parents or guardian to withhold treatment or nourishment discriminatorily by allowing the infant to remain in the institution.
Health care providers are responsible for the conduct of physi69
cians with respect to cases administered through their facilities.

The notice warned health care providers that failure to comply with
section 504 would subject a hospital to possible termination of fed64. Id.
65. Id. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides in pertinent part as
follows:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive
agency or by the United States Postal Service. The head of each such agency
shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the amendments to this section made by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services,
and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978. Copies of any proposed regulation shall be submitted to appropriate authorizing committees of the Congress,
and such regulation may take effect no earlier than the thirtieth day after the
date on which such regulation is so submitted to such committees.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). For text of § 706(7)(B), see infra note 95.
66. 47 Fed. Reg. 26027 (1982).
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(1)(v)).
69. Id.
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eral assistance.70
III.

BABY DOE REGULATIONS

I

On March 7, 1983, HHS followed up the aforementioned notice
with an interim final rule entitled "Nondiscrimination on the Basis
of Handicap."' 7 ' This rule was not issued pursuant to the Federal
72
Administrative Procedure Act's [hereinafter referred to as APA]
notice and comment period requirement.7 3 The Secretary of HHS
felt that dispensing with the notice and comment period was necessary, since "[a]ny delay would leave lives at risk." 74
Thus, the rule
75
took effect less than thirty days after publication.
The rule provided a toll free number for persons to report suspected violations of section 504.76 It also provided that a notice be
posted "[i]n a conspicuous place in each delivery ward, each maternity ward, each pediatric ward, and each nursery, including each
intensive care nursery."' 77 The notice was to state, in part:
DISCRIMINATORY FAILURE TO FEED AND CARE
FOR HANDICAPPED INFANTS IN THIS FACILITY IS
PROHIBITED BY FEDERAL LAW
Any person having knowledge that a handicapped infant is being discriminatorilydeniedfood or customary medical careshould
immediately contact:
78
Handicapped Infant Hotline ....

The interim final rule also stated that information received
through the Handicapped Infant Hotline that amounted to child
abuse or neglect would be referred to state agencies "in order to
give States an opportunity to make their own investigation and to
70. Id.

71. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983).
72. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-76 (1982). The Federal Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter cited as APA], enacted in 1946, provides procedural requirements administrative
agencies must follow with regard to rule making.
73. 5 U.S.C. 553 (1982). The Secretary of HHS found that:
[T]his interim final rule is exempt from the requirements [of the thirty-day
notice period] of 5 U.S.C. § 553. Under 45 CFR §§ 80.6(d) and 84.61, the
Secretary is already authorized to specify the manner in which recipients
make available information concerning federal legal protections against discrimination toward the handicapped. The exception to the 10-day waiting
period of 45 CFR § 80.8(d)(3) and the exception to 45 CFR § 80.6(c) to allow
access outside normal business hours are minor technical changes and are necessary to meet emergency situations.
48 Fed. Reg. 9630, 9631 (1983).
74. 48 Fed. Reg. at 9631.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol22/iss1/5

10

1985]

Phillips: "New" Rights for Handicapped Newborns: Baby Doe and Beyond
"NEW" RIGHTS FOR HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS
137

take appropriate action. ' 79 When effective state action was taken,
HHS anticipated that no further federal efforts would be necessary.
However, the rule did provide that "for those cases where direct
federal action appears helpful, the Secretary will have at his disposal the usual means of federal civil rights enforcement." 80 As such,
the rule made it "possible for the Secretary to conduct immediate
investigations and to make immediate referrals to the Department
of Justice for such legal action as may be necessary to save the life
of a handicapped child who is subjected to discrimination by a
recipient." 8 1
Further, and to the ire of the medical community, the interim
final rule provided for immediate departmental access to records
and facilities of hospitals, which was not "limited to normal business hours."'8 2 This clause was to become operative "[w]hen, in the
judgment of the responsible Department official, immediate access
[was] necessary to protect the life or health of a handicapped
83
individual."
The medical community immediately went on the attack. The
American Academy of Pediatrics filed suit against the Secretary of
HHS, Margaret M. Heckler. 84 The Academy attacked the procedure under which the rule was promulgated. 85 Judge Gesell, stating
that the Administrative Procedure Act 86 was "designed to curb bureaucratic actions taken without consultation and notice to persons
affected," '87 invalidated the rule. 88 Still, even though the court invalidated the rule on procedural grounds, Judge Gesell stated that
"[g]iven the language of the statute and its similarity to other civil
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 9630.
83. Id.
84. American Academy of Pediatrics,561 F. Supp. at 395.
85. Id. at 398. See supra note 73 for the exemption upon which the Secretary of
HHS relied.
86. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-76 (1982).
87. American Academy of Pediatrics,561 F. Supp. at 398.
88. Id. at 403. See also 48 Fed. Reg. 17588 (1983). The rule was invalidated under
§ 706(2)(A) and § 553(b) and (d) of the APA. Section 553(b) is the general notice provision of the APA. It states that "when the agency for good cause finds... that notice
and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest," the section concerning notice does not apply. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1982).
(Recall that the Secretary of HHS issued the rules without notice because to delay
would leave lives at risk. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.) Additionally,
§ 553(d) has an exception dispensing with the thirty-day advance publication requirement for "good cause." 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). Nevertheless, the court rejected arguments based on these exceptions, reasoning that "[sluch an argument could as easily be
used to justify immediate implementation of any sort of health or safety regulation, no
matter how small the risk for the population at large or how long-standing the problem." 561 F. Supp. at 401.
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rights statutes which have been broadly read, it cannot be said that
section 504 does not authorize some regulation of the provision of
'8 9
some types of medical care to handicapped newborns.
The rule thus invalidated, the Department of HHS tried once
again to remedy the problem through regulations aimed at hospitals
receiving federal financial assistance. 90 On July 5, 1983, HHS issued a notice of proposed rulemaking concerning nondiscrimination
on the basis of handicap for infants. 9 1 The new proposal provided
92
for a thirty-day comment period, as required by the APA.
IV.

BABY DOE REGULATIONS II

In issuing the notice of proposed rulemaking, HHS again relied
on section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 93 The proposed
rules stated that:
Section 504 is in essence an equal treatment, non-discrimination standard. Congress patterned Section 504 on Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination based on race.
Programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance may
not deny a benefit or service solely on grounds of a person's
handicap, just as they may
not deny a benefit or service on
94
grounds of a person's race.
These rules were more definitive. They provided a definition of
"handicapped individual" based on the Rehabilitation Act.95 They
also delineated when section 504 would apply. Specifically, the proposed rules explained that:
Section 504 would hold that where an infant would not benefit
medically from a particular treatment, the infant would not be
"qualified" to receive the treatment; thus, its denial would not
violate Section 504.
Section 504 does not compel medical personnel to attempt to
perform impossible or futile acts or therapies. Thus, Section 504
does not require the imposition of futile therapies which merely
temporarily prolong the process of dying of an infant born terminally will [sic], such
as a child born with anencephaly or intracranial bleeding. 96
89. American Academy of Pediatrics,561 F. Supp. at 402.
90. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap Relating to Health Care for
Handicapped Infants, 48 Fed. Reg. 30846 (1983).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
94. 48 Fed. Reg. at 30846.
95. Id. Specifically, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 defines a handicapped individual as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
96. 48 Fed. Reg. at 30846-47.
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The proposed rules were an attempt to limit a physician's decision concerning the treatment of handicapped infants to a bona fide
medical judgment. The doctor was to consider the benefits to the
patient that treatment would provide, as opposed to any risks from
the treatment. Any decision based on a doctor's subjective beliefs
about handicapped individuals was not considered a bonafide medical judgment. Rather, it was considered to be based on the doctor's
personal belief about what life would be worth living. The proposed
rules analogized the situation of a handicapped infant to that of a
black infant denied medical care simply because of his race.97 Such
a decision would not be a medical judgment. The proposed rules
similarly stated that "[a] judgment not to correct an intestinal obstruction or repair the heart of a Down's syndrome infant because
the infant suffers the handicap of Down's syndrome is likewise not a
medical judgment." 98
Under the proposed rules, the failure to provide medical treatment for a life-threatening defect because an infant suffered from
another defect which was not life-threatening, would be a violation
of section 504. For instance, a retarded child born with a detached
esophagus, that prevented feeding, could not be denied surgery to
correct the esophagus simply because he or she was retarded. The
decision to do so would be discriminatory because children of normal intelligence would not be denied the life saving surgery.
The rules did not provide that corrective surgery must be performed when, based upon a physician's legitimate medical opinion,
a child would die imminently. Such would be the case with
anencephaly. 99 Nor did the rules prohibit withholding extraordinary care to extremely low-birthweight infants.i °° However, the
proposed rules stated that, "[a]t the same time, the basic provision
of nourishment, fluids, and routine nursing care is a fundamental
matter of human dignity, not an option for medical judgment." 10 1
Further, it was provided that "[e]ven if a handicapped infant faces
imminent and unavoidable death, no health care provider should
take upon itself to cause death by starvation or dehydration. Routine nursing care to provide comfort and cleanliness is required to
97. Id. at 30847.
98. Id.

99. Id. at 30852. Anencephaly is defined as a condition occurring in one out of
every 1,000 births that is marked by the partial or total absence of the brain. Ellis,
supra note 7, at 397.

100.
sults of
medical
1979).
101.

48 Fed. Reg. at 30852. For a horrifying and heartrending account of the redoctors overzealously treating an extremely premature infant for the sake of
research, see Stinson, On the Death of a Baby, 244 ATL.MONTHLY 64 (July,
48 Fed. Reg. at 30852.
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respect the dignity of such an infant." 10 2
Once again, the medical community attacked the proposed rules
with vigor. Among the concerns of physicians, was that crank calls
would be received over the Handicapped Infant Hotline, causing
federal investigators to descend on hospitals and thereby monopolize the doctors' and staff's time. 10 3 Additionally, the rules were
attacked as a "flawed and ill-defined set of rules under which physicians are to perform their medical duties."' 1 4 A pair of commentators even suggested that children born with anencephaly should not
be fed since it was an "empty futile gesture, one which 'merely temporarily [prolongs] the process of dying of an infant born terminally
ill.'

",105

On January 12, 1984, HHS issued its "final rules" on the subject. 0 6 The rules were comprehensive and exhaustive. HHS had
received almost 17,000 comments in response to its notice of proposed rulemaking of July 5, 1983.107 The Department's statistics
indicated that 97.5% of the persons responding supported the rules,
while only 2.5% opposed them.108 Of interest is the fact that of 141
newborn care specialists or pediatricians who commented, 27.7%
favored the rules and 72.3% opposed them.l °9 Of 253 responding
physicians who were not pediatricians, 55.3% favored the rules and
44.7% opposed them. 1 0 And, as to the 322 nurses who commented, 97.5% supported the rules, while only 2.5% opposed
them. 1 Among the nurses that responded favorably, one stated:
I am a registered nurse and have worked in the labor and delivery area, newborn nursery and intensive care nursery .... I
think the average American would be shocked at the decisions
that are made regarding "non-perfect" infants. I have personally
heard physicians and nurses talk to new parents about their child
and persuade the parents to "let the child die and therefore end
its suffering"-which really meant "let us starve your child to
death"-that is certainly not a humane way to "let a child
102. Id.
103. Holden, HHS Preparingto Issue New Baby Doe Rules, 221 Sci. 1269, 1270

(1983).
104. American Society of Law & Medicine Committee on the Legal and Ethical
Aspects of Health Care for Children, Comments and Recommendations on the "Infant
Doe" ProposedRegulations, I1L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 203 (1983).
105. Paris & Fletcher, Infant Doe Regulations and the Absolute Requirement to Use
Nourishment andFluidsfor the Dying Infant, II L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 210 (1983).
106. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap; Procedures and Guidelines Relating to Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 49 Fed. Reg. 1622 (1984) (codified at 45
C.F.R. § 84 (1984)).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1623.
109. Id.

110. Id.
111. Id.
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die."
A doctor who opposed the rules commented that:
Recently I have treated a 13-month old black child who has
congenital heart disease, spastic encephalopathy, vomiting, repeated bouts of bilateral pneumonia, internal squint of the left
eye, and mental deficiency. He is one of the thousands of children who are the victims of the neonatal intensive care units located in every medical center. He was born premature, weighing
two pounds and ten ounces. With modern treatment and instruments he survived. These children have no future and are a terrible burden on their parents and this nation.
* * * What good is it treating these premature babies? Will
it not be better if they are left to die? * * * We are comof conpounding our problems by bringing into life thousands
113
genitally sick babies which nature has rejected.
The Association for Retarded Citizens stated an opposing view, in
support of the standard of providing medically beneficial treatment:
No quality of life or other such considerations are acceptable
to the ARC. Although we are primarily a parent organization
and many ARC members have had significant difficulty (financial, emotional, etc.) raising their mentally retarded child, we
come down strongly on the side of the child.
Available medical and other technology is not able to fully
predict the future capacity of most mentally retarded children,
especially in the first days and weeks of life. Our members can
cite numerous examples of improper and wrong advice given to
them by114physicians about the future capacities of their
children.
A contrary opinion, suggesting different articulations of standards,
was stated by the American Medical Association:
QUALITY OF LIFE. In the making of decisions for the
treatment of seriously deformed newborns. . . the primary consideration should be what is best for the individual patient and
not the avoidance of a burden to the family or to society. Quality
of life is a factor to be considered in determining what is best for
the individual. Life should be cherished despite disabilities and
handicaps, except when prolongation would be inhumane and
unconscionable. Under these circumstances, withholding or removing life supporting means is ethical provided that the normal
care given an individual who is ill is not discontinued. In desperate situations involving newborns, the advice and judgment of
the physician should be readily available, but the decision
whether to exert maximal efforts to sustain life should be the
choice of the parents. The parents should be told the options,
expected benefits, risks and limits of any proposed care; how the
112. Id. at 1645.
113. Id. at 1629 (submitted by an Ala. physician; deletions in original).
114. Id.
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potential for human relationships is affected by the infant's condition; and relevant information and answers to their questions.
The presumption is that the love which parents usually have for
their children will be dominant in the decisions which they make
in determining what is in the best interest of their children. It is
to be expected that parents will act unselfishly, particularly
where life itself is at stake. Unless there is convincing evidence
to
115
the contrary, parental authority should be respected.
With some changes in the proposed rules, based on the comments
11 6
received, the final rules were adopted.
V. A NEW CASE ARISES
In the meantime, another case concerning a handicapped infant
was working its way through the legal system. At the center of this
controversy was a baby who became known to the public as Baby
Jane Doe. 1 7 She was born on October 11, 1983, and suffered from
multiple handicaps.' 8 Among the disorders she suffered at birth
were: spina bifida, "a failure of the closure of the bones and the
coverings of the spinal cord;"1 1 9 microcephaly, "a small head circumference, bespeaking increased pressure in the cranial cavity;" 1 20
and, hydrocephalus, "a condition in which fluid fails to drain from
the cranial areas." 1 21 The infant was transferred to Stony Brook
Hospital with the expectation that surgery would be performed to
correct the spina bifida and hydrocephalic conditions.
The parents refused to consent to the surgery.122 Rather, they
elected to follow what was deemed a "conservative course of treatment."1 23 If surgery had been performed, the risk of infection associated with spina bifida might have been significantly reduced 24
and may have increased the child's life span.125 However, it carried
with it neurological complications of surgical repair.126 On the
other hand, the conservative course of treatment consisted of treatment through antibiotic therapy.12 7 Indeed, while the mortality
115. Id.
116. 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1984).
117. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, aff'd, 60
N.Y.2d 208,456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); United States v.
University Hosp., State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y.
1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Weber v. Stony Brook Hospital, 95 A.D.2d at 588, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.

125. DeKornfeld, Baby Jane Doe, 1 PULMONARY MED. & TECH. 43 (1984).
126. Id.
127. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
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rate is higher when the conservative course of treatment is followed,
12 8
it does not place the infant in imminent danger of death.
On October 16, 1983, Lawrence Washburn petitioned the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Suffolk County, seeking
the appointment of a guardian ad litem for Baby Jane Doe.129 He
also sought an order directing the hospital to perform the surgical
procedures. 130 Washburn was an attorney from Vermont who had
1 31
no connection with the infant or her family.
The New York Supreme Court, Suffolk County, appointed William Weber as guardian ad litem for the infant.1 32 It subsequently
found that Baby Jane Doe was " 'in need of immediate surgical procedures to preserve her life,' and ordered that the surgical procedures be performed." 133 The parents and hospital filed an appeal in
13 4
the supreme court, appellate division.
The issue the appellate division addressed was whether the parents had "been neglectful of their newborn infant in failing to provide her with 'adequate * * * medical * * * care' "135 according to
New York statutes.1 36 First, the court noted that the proceeding
was proper under the parenspatriae doctrine, pursuant to which a
state may act "as the general guardian of all infants." 137 Second,
the court found that in accordance with the parenspatriaedoctrine,
a state "may direct medical treatment of a minor, in appropriate
circumstances, over parental objection."1 38 As such, the court determined that the parents had simply "chosen one course of appropriate medical treatment over another" 139 and, therefore, reversed

the lower court and vacated the order appointing the guardian ad
14
litem.
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals found that the
supreme court had "abused its discretion as a matter of law by permitting [the] proceeding to go forward."' 141 It thus affirmed the ap128. Id.
129. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. at 610.
130. Id.
131. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 146.
132. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. at 610.
133. Id.
134. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d at 587, 467 N.Y.S. 2d at 685.
135. Id. at 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
136. N.Y. JUDICIARY § 1012(f)(i)(A) (McKinney 1983).
137. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d at 588, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686 (citing
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972)).
138. Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944); In re Storar,
52 N.Y.2d 363, 377 (1981); Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 546 (1976)).
139. Id. at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
140. Id. at 590, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
141. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 210, 210-11, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1187,
469 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64 (1983).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1985

17

California Western Law Review, Vol. 22 [1985], No. 1, Art. 5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 22

pellate division's dismissal1 42 on a different ground; particularly,
that Washburn, according to the court, had circumvented the procedures of the New York Family Court Act 143 by applying directly
to a justice of the supreme court. 44
The New York Family Court Act provides that child neglect proceedings may be initiated by a child protective agency or a" 'person
on the court's direction.' ",145 Primary responsibility for initiating
proceedings has, therefore, been assigned by the legislature to child
protective agencies; all others may only file petitions if directed by
the court to do So. 14 6 Thus, Washburn's actions failed because he
sought court action directly, rather than going through a child protective agency. Such statutory violations were condemned by the
court for the additional reason that they would give the right to any
person "to institute judicial proceedings which would catapult him
into the very heart of a family circle, there to challenge the most
private and most precious responsibility invested in the parents for
the care and nurture of their children." 14 7
Nevertheless, the litigation and controversy concerning Baby
Jane Doe continued. For, while the state court proceedings were
still in progress, a complaint was filed with the Department of HHS
alleging that the infant was being "discriminatorily denied medically indicated treatment on the basis of her physical and mental
14 8
handicaps."
HHS obtained a copy of the record of the state court proceedings,
which included medical records pertaining to the infant through
October 19, 1983.149 The record was reviewed by the Surgeon General of the United States who, among other things, determined that:
An appropriate determination concerning whether the current
care of Infant Jane Doe is within the bounds of legitimate medical judgment, rather than based solely on a handicapping condition which is not a medical contraindication to surgical
treatment, cannot be made without immediate access to, and
careful review of, current medical records and other sources150of
information within the possession or control of the hospital.
Thus, beginning on October 22, 1983, HHS repeatedly requested
that the University Hospital provide it with access to all of Baby
142. Id. at 211, 456 N.E.2d at 1187-88, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64-65.
143. N.Y. JUDICIARY §§ 1111-12 (McKinney 1982). See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
144. 60 N.Y.2d at 211, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
145. Id. at 212, 456 N.E.2d at 1187, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 213, 456 N.E.2d at 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
148. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 611 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
149. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1984).
150. Id.
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Jane Doe's medical records.1 5 1 The University Hospital refused to
release the records. 152 It based its decision on the refusal of the
parents to consent to a release of the records and on "'serious concerns both as to the Department's jurisdiction and the procedures
the Department has employed in initiating an inquiry.' "153 Consequently, the United States filed an action seeking an order directing
University Hospital to allow HHS access to the medical records. 1 54
This action was based upon section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973155 and a regulation promulgated under said statute.15 6 Specifically, section 84.61 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations incorporates by reference the provisions of section 80.6(c),
which provides that recipients of federal financial assistance shall
permit the Department of HHS access to records to determine
whether the recipient is complying with the Act. 157 As such, the
government sought the medical records to determine whether the
failure to perform the surgery on Baby Jane Doe was in violation of
section 504.158
In addressing the standards for determining the government's
right of access to records, the district court explained that the regulations were designed so that the government could determine
whether the recipient of federal financial assistance was discriminating against someone in violation of the Act. 159 The court, therefore,
reasoned that if a recipient was clearly not violating the Act by discriminating against handicapped persons, HHS could not obtain the

records. 160
Accordingly, the next issue the court considered was whether the

hospital had violated the prohibition against discrimination. The
court found it to be undisputed that the hospital had not discrimi-

nated on the basis of Baby Jane Doe's handicap because it was at all
times willing to perform the operation, but had simply not done so
151. Id.

152. Id.
153. 729 F.2d at 148.
154. 575 F. Supp. at 609.
155. Id. See also supra note 65. The government was arguing the case under § 504

rather than the final rules discussed supra, because the rules were not issued until January 12, 1984 and the case was argued on November 17, 1983.
156. 575 F. Supp. at 609.

157. Id. 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(c) (1984) provides in part that:
"Asserted considerations of privacy or confidentiality may not operate to bar

the Department from evaluating or seeking to enforce compliance with this
part. Information of a confidential nature obtained in connection with com-

pliance evaluation or enforcement shall not be disclosed except where neces-

sary in formal enforcement proceedings or where otherwise required by law."
158.

575 F. Supp. at 609.

159. Id. at 613-14.
160. Id. at 614.
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because of the parents' refusal to consent to the procedures. 161
Without the parents' or other guardians' consent, the hospital could
not legally perform the operation. As such, the court found the
hospital had not violated the Rehabilitation Act by discriminating
162
against Baby Jane Doe "solely by reason of her handicap."
The court went on to explain that the papers submitted demonstrated conclusively that the parents' decision to refuse to consent
to surgery was a reasonable one based on the medical options available and on a "genuine concern for the best interests of the
child."' 163 It added that even if the parents' decision had been based
on discriminatory considerations, and had not been based on a reasonable medical consideration, the hospital would not have violated
the Act. 164
The court thus found it unnecessary to address the hospital's contention that a release of the infant's medical records to the HHS
without the parents' consent would violate the constitutional right
to privacy and New York legislation concerning the doctor-patient
relationship.165 "It would be highly paradoxical," the court observed, "if an individual's right to privacy could be asserted by that
individual's parent. . . purportedly acting in that individual's own
best interests, for the purpose of precluding an inquiry into the
question of whether the parent. . . was infact acting in the indi66
vidual's best interests."'
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, 67 the government alleged that the district court's finding
that no discrimination had occurred could only apply to the period
up to October 19 (the eight days for which medical records were
1 68 It
available at the time the proceedings were at the state level).
stressed that" '[m]edical decisionmaking is a dynamic process,' "169
and that whatever Baby Jane Doe's condition was before October
19, it may have changed so that the hospital's action was in fact
discriminatory under section 504. The government also contended
that the records were necessary to determine whether the hospital's
failure to seek a court order overriding the parent's decision was in
itself discrimination in violation of section 504170 and, therefore,
that the district court erred in finding that the parents' refusal to
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 614-15.
Id. at 615.
Id.
Id. at 616-17.
United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (1984).
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id.
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"conclusively established the hospital's
consent to surgery
1 71
nondiscrimination."
On the other hand, the hospital argued that section 504 was never
intended to serve as a basis for federal intervention in medical decisionmaking. 172 Additionally, the hospital contended that the physician-patient privilege and the constitutional right of privacy barred
access to the records. 173
The precise issue identified by the court was one of statutory construction: "[W]hether section 504 authorizes HHS to investigate
medical treatment decisions involving defective newborn infants."17 4 With the issue thus framed, the court first reviewed the
unsettled regulatory history of section 504. It observed that in May
of 1976, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare [hereinafter referred to as HEW], the predecessor to HHS, had requested
comments on fifteen critical issues pertaining to section 504.175
Among these issues was "'[w]hether a regulation should contain
provisions concerning [institutionalized] patients' rights to receive
or refuse treatment.' ",176 In response to the comments received,
on. . . [this] subject is
HEW indicated that "to promulgate " rules
1
beyond the authority of section 504. 77
The court continued by noting that HEW's limited view of the
guidelines was reflected in HEW's first set of proposed regulations,
which were criticized for lacking specificity.17 It observed that the
final section 504 regulations, issued in May of 1977, offered more
specific guidance as to the type of discrimination prohibited by the
Act, while emphasizing the "'basic requirement of equal opportuThe court quoted the agency as
,179
"
nity to receive benefits ....
follows:
"[A] burn treatment center need not provide other types of medical treatment to handicapped persons unless it provides such
medical services to nonhandicapped persons. It could not, however, refuse to 180
treat the burns of a deaf person because of his or
her deafness."
The court then observed that it was not until five years after the
issuance of the final regulations that HHS took the position that
171. 729 F.2d at 149.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. 729 F.2d at 151.

175. Id. at 152 (citing 41 Fed. Reg. 29548) (1976). [The Department of Health,
Education and Welfare is hereinafter referred to as HEW].

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

152 (citing 41 Fed. Reg. at 20296-97) (1976).
152 (citing 41 Fed. Reg. 29548, 29559) (1976).
152; see also 45 C.F.R. § 84.52 (1984).
152 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84, Appendix A, f 36 (1984)).
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section 504 "made it unlawful for hospitals receiving 'Federal fimancial assistance' to withhold nutrition, or medical, or surgical treatment from handicapped infants if required to correct a lifethreatening condition."18 1 It noted that the interim final rules that
had been proposed, had been struck down in American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Heckler as (1) "a product of 'haste and inexperience,' "182 and (2) due to the Secretary of HHS's failure to follow
the procedural requirements of the APA.18 3 The court also mentioned the second set of HHS's final rules, Baby Doe Regulations II,
and
which were promulgated after oral argument on this1 appeal
4
modified the proposed rules in several major respects.
In sum, the court found that the regulatory history of section 504
was inconsistent inasmuch as "HHS's current view of the scope of
the statute is flatly at odds with the position originally taken by
HEW." 18 5 Thus lacking the "benefit of an administering agency's
longstanding, consistent interpretation to which we otherwise might
have looked for guidance," the court turned to the statutory language to settle the issue. 186
In its process of statutory construction, the court began by looking at the language of the statute. First, the court inquired as to
whether Baby Jane Doe was a handicapped individual under the
statute.18 7 While it was clear to the court that she suffered from
impairments, it was not as convinced that the impairments limited
her "major life activities."188 The hospital argued that the term major life activities should be limited to programs of education, vocational rehabilitation and training. As such, it contended that
newborns were excluded under the Act. 189 The court did not agree.
It held that Baby Jane Doe was handicapped as defined under the
Act, explaining that "it would defy common sense to rule that she is
not presently regarded as handicapped under section
706(7)(B)(iii)." 1 90
Next, the court had to determine whether Baby Jane Doe could
be considered as an "otherwise qualified individual" who was "sub181. 729 F.2d at 152.

182. Id. at 153 (quoting American Academy of Pediatrics,561 F. Supp. at 400).
183. Id. at 153 (citing American Academcy of Pediatrics, 561 F. Supp. at 401).
184. Id. at 154.

185. Id. The court further observed that "[n]otwithstanding HHS's claims to the
contrary, . . the current view also represents something of a retreat from the interpretation HHS adopted just last year." Id.
186. Id. See supra note 65 for language of § 504.
187. Id. at 155. Section 504 refers to 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) for the definition of "handicapped individual." See supra note 95 for the text of 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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jected to discrimination" within the meaning of section 504.191 It
noted that cases construing the clause were generally those involving educational institutions. 192 Quoting from one such Second Circuit case, 193 the court recognized that "'it is now clear that [the
phrase "otherwise qualified handicapped individual"] refers to a
person who is qualified in spite of her handicap and that an institution is not required to disregard the disabilities of a handicapped
applicant, provided the handicap is relevant to reasonable qualifications for acceptance.' "194 Thus, the court stated, it was established
that section 504 prohibits discrimination against a handicapped individual only where the handicap is unrelated to the services in
question. 195 However, in instances where medical treatment is at
issue, the court pointed out that the "otherwise qualified" criterion
of section 504 could not meaningfully be applied. 19 6 Specifically,
the court explained that the handicap
itself gives rise to the need for
197
medical services in such situations.
Third, in addressing the contention that Baby Jane Doe may have
been "subjected to discrimination," the court attacked the government's argument by stating that a determination of whether a particular decision was discriminatory would invariably require
lengthy litigation to determine whether a decision not to treat was
based on a "bona fide medical judgment." 198 Before finding that
"Congress intended to spawn this type of litigation under section
504," the court stated that it "would want more proof than is apparent from the face of the statute."1 9 9 As such, the court next
reviewed the legislative intent behind section 504.
The court determined that the void in the legislative history, in
addition to a number of measures limiting federal involvement in
medical treatment decisions which were passed prior to the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act, provided the best clues to congressional intent regarding section 504's coverage of health services. 20°
Specifically, the court quoted the very first section of the medicare
law, which provides in pertinent part:
"Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize any
Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control
191. Id. at 156.
192. Id.

193. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
194. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156 (quoting Doe v. New York
Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981)).
195. 729 F.2d at 156.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 157.

199. Id.
200. Id. at 158-60.
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over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical
services are provided....
Similarly, the court cited the Professional Standards Review Organization provisions of the Social Security Act, 20 2 which also evidences a policy against the involvement of federal personnel in
medical treatment decisions.
As such, the court stated that it could not "presume that by enacting section 504, congress intended the federal government to
enter the field of child care, which as HHS has recently acknowledged, has traditionally been occupied by the states. '20 3 The court
went on to hold that:
Our review of the legislative history has shown that Congress
never contemplated that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
would apply to treatment decisions involving defective newborn
infants when the statute was enacted in 1973, when it was
amended in 1974, or at any subsequent time.
* * * Until Congress has spoken, it would be an unwarranted
exercise of judicial power to approve
the type of investigation
2°
that has precipitated this lawsuit. 4
The court thus concluded by confirming the district court's finding that the hospital had not discriminated against Baby Jane Doe
because it had always been willing to perform the corrective surgery
on her if only her parents would consent. 20 5 The court felt that by
"[r]equiring the hospital either to undertake surgery notwithstanding the parents' decision or alternatively, to petition the state court
to override the parents' decision, would impose a particularly onerous affirmative action burden upon the hospital. ' 20 6 As such, the
20 7
court affirmed the district court.
An additional blow to the federal regulatory attempts to prohibit
nontreatment decisions under section 504 came on May 23, 1984,
when the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York invalidated the final rules issued on January 12, 1984.208
The district court cited as its authority United States v. University
20 9
Hospital.
Associations supporting the right of handicapped individuals
then turned their attention to the United States Congress. Bills
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 160 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1982) (rst enacted in 1965)).
42 U.S.C. § 1320c (1982 and Supp. 1983).
729 F.2d at 160.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 160.

206. Id.
207. Id. at 161.
208. American Hosp. Assoc. v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), cer.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985). See supra text pp. 138-42, Baby Doe Regulations I.
209. Id.
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were introduced to amend the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act.2 10 The legislation that emerged, the Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984,211 was the result of compromise on the part
of handicapped rights groups, right to life supporters and a large
number of medical organizations. 21 2 The noted exception to the
medical groups supporting the bill was the American Medical Association. 21 3 The American Medical Association walked out of negotiations because the language of the bill failed to include as a
consideration when making non-treatment decisions, the infant's future quality of life. 2 14 Nevertheless, on October 9, 1984, the bill was
2 15
signed into law.

VI.

BAiY DOE REGULATIONS III

On December 10, 1984, HIIS once again issued a notice of proposed rulemaking. 216 This notice deals largely with changes in
grant requirements under the Child Abuse Amendments. 21 7 Other
changes required by the Amendments were to be the subject of future rulemaking procedures. 21 8 In the proposed rules, HHS has declared that "disabled infants must under all circumstances receive
appropriate nutrition, hydration and medication.1 2 19 In addition,
the infants "must be given medically indicated treatment. ' 220 The
rules indicate HHS's continuing concern that the death of handicapped infants is being caused or hastened by a failure of doctors to
order feeding of disabled newborns.
Of importance is the fact that the "reasonable medical judgment"
that a physician is to exercise when making a nontreatment decision
is given meaning by the proposed rules. The judgment "must be
one that would be made by a reasonably prudent physican. . . . It
is not to be based on subjective 'quality of life' or other abstract
'22 1
concepts.
210. See supra note 3.
211. See supra note 2.
212. The Village Voice, Nov. 27, 1984, at 8, col. 1. Among the Medical Organizations supporting the bill were the American Hospital Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Catholic Health Association, the National Association of
Children's Hospitals and Related Institutions, the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, the American Nurses Association, and the American College of

Physicians.
213. The San Diego Union, Oct. 10, 1984, at A6, col. 1.
214. The Village Voice, supra note 212.
215. 42 U.S.C.S. § 5101(b)(6) (Supp. 1985).

216. Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 49 Fed. Reg.
48160 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340).
217. Id.

218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id. at 48163.
Id.
Id.
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Additionally, the proposed rules urge the establishment of Infant
Care Review Committees. 2 22 These review committees are expected
to develop guidelines for the treatment of disabled infants and act as
a guide to hospital staffs and families concerning the availability of
community resources to help deal with a child's handicap. 223 Most
importantly, the committees are to review treatment and nontreatment decisions within the hospital. When a committee feels that
appropriate decisions are not being made, it must contact the State
Child Protective Service Agency for immediate legal intervention. 224 In a separate procedure, HHS has established interim
guidelines for review committees. 225 In addition to medical personnel, the committees must consist of a social worker, a representative
from the legal community, a representative of a disability group,
and a lay community member. 226 Further, the committees are required to maintain records of their deliberations, which include a
summary of cases considered and the disposition of these cases. 227
The authority and procedure by which the review committee acts
when there is a disagreement between the family and physician concerning treatment has also been established. When a family wishes
to continue life-sustaining treatment, its wishes are to be followed.2 2 8 When there is disagreement and the family refuses to
consent, the review committee is to consider the case. If the committee agrees with the family, the committee should "recommend"
that treatment be withheld.2 29 However, if the committee disagrees
with the family, it must recommend to the hospital that the case be
referred to a child protective services agency.2 30 In that situation.,
every effort is to be made to prevent the infant's condition from
worsening until "such time as the court or agency renders a deci'231
sion or takes other appropriate action.
VII.

THE STATE APPROACH

The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 require states to include
medical neglect in their child abuse prevention legislation. 232 A
number of states had already considered the issue prior to the pas222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
(1984).

Id. at 48165.
Id. at 48162.
Id.
49 Fed. Reg. at 48170-73 (1984).
Id. at 48171.
Id.
Id. at 48172.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, § 101, 98 Stat. 1749
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sage of the Amendments. 233 Five states had passed legislation con235
cerning newborns 234 and two had passed resolutions.
Specifically, the 1982 California resolution condemns the treatment of Baby Doe and expresses distress that an infant would be
"allowed to die by calculated neglect because the infant was born
mentally retarded. '236 Further, it declares that neither hospitals
nor courts should "selectively deprive infants of life sustaining
nourishment" based upon an evaluation of the handicapped child's
existence. 237 It concludes by declaring that "no handicapped infants in the state shall be denied food, water, or medical attention
'238
solely on the basis of handicap.
'239
In comparison, the Pennsylvania law is entitled "Infanticide.
It provides that any infant born alive is entitled to full constitutional
protection and that physicians must provide to all infants "that type
and degree of care and treatment which, in the good faith judgment
of the physician, is commonly and customarily provided to any
other person under similar conditions and circumstances.' 4 If the
parents fail to consent to treatment, the physician is under an affirmative duty to notify the juvenile court. 24 1 Moreover, the law
provides that a knowing violation is a third degree felony subjecting
the violator to a seven year prison sentence. 242
VIII.

Is

THERE A NEED FOR LEGISLATION?

"Withholding necessary medical care from defective newborns in
order to cause their death is a common practice in many medical
centers across the United States. ' 243 A number of studies indicate
233. Feldman & Murray, State Legislation and the HandicappedNewborn: A Moral
and Political Dilemma, 12 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 156, 163 (1984). The states
which have considered legislation are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, North Car-

olina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
234. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2281 (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-

3(f) (West Supp. 1984) (passed following the Baby Doe case); L.A. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.36.1 (West Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-3 (Supp. 1983); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3212(b) (1983).
235. S. Con. Res. 75, 5 Cal. Stats. and Amends. to Code Res. Ch. 178 at 6872
(1982); S.J. Res. 17, Tenn. Pub. Acts 996-97 (1983).
236. S.Con. Res. 75, supra.
237. Id.

238. Id.
239. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3212.

240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243.

J. ROBERTSON, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY

AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS 213 (A. Doudera and J. Peters ed. 1982).
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that doctors favor euthanasia of defective newborns. 244 One report
states that 50% of the doctors surveyed, given complete anonymity,

favor euthanasia for Down's syndrome children with an intestinal

obstruction. 245 Another indicates that 76.8% of pediatric surgeons
would acquiesce in such a decision by parents.24 6 Further, 23.6%
of the pediatric surgeons surveyed indicate they would encourage
parents to refuse consent for treatment of a newborn with intestinal
artesia and Down's syndrome. 247 Dr. Helen McKilligin, who re-

ported the first study, stated that, "[t]his shows that some physicians chose to view a relatively simple operation as an
insurmountable barrier and so excuse their. . . attitude. ' 248 The
study in Pediatricsalso reports that 62% of the respondents who

believe that children with Down's syndrome "are capable of being
useful and bringing love and happiness into the home," would still
acquiesce in a parents' non-treatment decision. 249

Doctors need not acquiesce to parents' decisions not to treat an
infant. All states have a proceeding to allow a guardian to be appointed to consent on behalf of a child to medical treatment. A
number of cases have, in fact, been brought. 250 In these cases, the
courts have appointed guardians to consent to treatment.25 1 Furthermore, in addition to statutory authority, courts may authorize
treatment under the parenspatriae doctrine. Under the doctrine, a
court of equity "has both the power and the responsibility to care

for and protect all those persons who, by virtue of some legal disa-

bility are unable to protect themselves. '252 The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court identified three state interests protected by
the doctrine: 1) A longstanding interest in protecting the welfare of

children living within its borders;253 2) An interest in preserving

244. Treating the Defective Newborn: A Survey of Physicians'Attitudes, HASTINGS
CTR. REP., Apr. 1976, at 2.
245. Id.
246. 48 Fed. Reg. at 30848 (1983); see also EthicalIssues in PediatricSurgery, 60
PEDIATRIcS 588 (1977).
247. Id.
248. Treating the Defective Newborn, supra note 244, at 2.
249. Ethical Issues, supra note 246, at 595.
250. A few by way of example are: In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. App.
1983); In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (1979), In re Cicero, 101 Misc.
2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1979); In re Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053
(1978); In re Jensen, 54 Or. App. 1, 633 P.2d 1302 (1981); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J.
463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d (1955).
251. Id.
252. In re Minor, 375 Mass. at 745, 379 N.E.2d at 1060.
253. Id. at 754-55, 379 N.E.2d at 1066. Quoting from Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 165 (1944), the court stated:
Indeed, this interest "is no mere corporate concern of official authority. It is
the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be both
safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and independent. . . [individuals]."
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life; and, 3) An interest in protecting the ethical integrity of the
medical profession, and in allowing hospitals the full opportunity to
care for people under their control. 254 Accordingly, courts have
held that a state's interest in youth cannot even be outweighed by a
parental claim of religious freedom. 2 55 Further, "[p]arents may be
free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they
'25 6
are free . . . to make martyrs of their children.
Nevertheless, a California appellate court recently recognized an
almost insurmountable deference to parental wishes. 25 7 The case,
entitled In re PhillipB.,258 involved a mildly retarded 25 9 twelve-year
old boy suffering from Down's syndrome and a congenital heart
defect that had already caused damage to his lungs. As long as the
heart defect remained uncorrected, it was determined that damage
to his lungs would increase to the point where his lungs would be
unable to carry and oxygenate blood. During the deterioration of
the lungs, it was said that Phillip would suffer from a progressive
loss of energy and vitality until he was forced to lead a bed-to-chair
existence.2 6° Death would follow.
Phillip's parents refused to consent to the corrective surgery. A
petition was filed seeking to have him declared a dependent child
for the special purpose of insuring that he receive the surgery. The
district court dismissed the petition. In affirming the dismissal, the
appellate court said that "[i]t is fundamental that parental autonomy is constitutionally protected. 2 6 1 Further, it declared that,
"[i]nherent in the preference for parental autonomy is a commitment to diverse lifestyles, including the right of parents to raise
'262
their children as they think best.
Without the surgery Phillip is "certain to die a slow, painful
death in the next five to ten years, with the last years full of agony
and suffering. With it, he has the potential for a long life of ordinary health.

' 263

However, the new rules and regulations promul-

gated by the Department of HHS provide absolutely no help to a
child in Phillip's position, for they apply only to children under one
Id.
254. 375 Mass. at 755, 379 N.E.2d at 1066.
255. In re Hamilton, supra note 250, 657 S.W.2d at 429.
256. In re Jensen, 54 Or. App. at 7, 633 P.2d at 1302 (1981) (citing Prince, supra
note 253).
257. In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied sub
nom., Bothman v. Warren B., 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
258. Id.
259. ROBERTSON, supra note 243, at 221.

260. In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d at 800, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
261. Id. at 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
262. Id., 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
263. ROBERTSON, supra note 243, at 222.
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year old.264 The California court should have heeded the well-reasoned advice of Justice Asch in In re Weberlist,265 wherein he concluded that "'[t]here is a strident cry in America to terminate the
lives of other people - deemed physically or mentally defective.'
This court was not constituted to heed that cry. Rather, . . . it is
our function to secure to each his opportunity for 'life, liberty and

the pursuit of happiness.'

"266

CONCLUSION

"Physicians may hold excessive power over decision making by
limiting or controlling the information made available to patients or
families. It seems appropriate that the profession be held accountable for presenting fully all management options and their expected
consequences. '267 By controlling the information regarding
newborns, physicians can control life and death decisions concerning infants. The infant once born is imbued with all the protections
our society provides others. These rights apply whether or not a
child is handicapped. Further, the child is entitled to protection by
the state under the parenspatriae doctrine.
The medical community-particularly the American Medical
Association-fights regulatory and statutory attempts to insure the
rights of these newborns. It wants to keep the decisions regarding
the life and death of these children a "low visibility" physician's
decision. The presumed decision would be made on the child's
probable "quality of life." Such is the standard that has been in
place on an ad hoc basis for years, yet it does not work. Sixty-two
percent of doctors in a survey who recognized that Down's syndrome children have a relatively high potential under the "Quality
of Life" standard, nevertheless, would allow those children to be
euthanized. Furthermore, there is absolutely no consistency to decisions made on an ad hoc basis. A child who might be treated in
one institution could be denied care in another. Additionally, doctors are unable to resolve a standard for themselves. On the one
hand, they view as unethical the discontinuance of a respirator for a
person who is classified as a vegetative remnant of life, yet acquiesce
to the euthanasia of a child capable of bringing love into a home.
Equally so, doctors cannot be expected to perform in a legal
abyss. They must know it is proper to withhold treatment from a
child to whom it would serve no benefit. Doctors must know when
264.
265.
266.
Justice
267.

49 Fed. Reg. at 48163 (1984).
In re Weberlist, 79 Misc. 2d 753, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1974).
In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d at 755-56, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 968 (1979) (quoting
Asch, In re Weberlist, 79 Misc. 2d at 755-56).
289 N. ENGL. J. MED. at 894.
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a child is born what their obligations are to it. They have no duty
to prolong the dying process when it is inevitable, but they are
under an equal duty not to hasten the death of a child by withholding food from it. Physicians should not act with dismay when government attempts to prevent this. The American psyche cannot
tolerate images of children being starved to death.
The medical community has a right not to be hauled into court
when a reasonable medical judgment has been made. The case of
Baby Jane Doe is an excellent case in point. All the medical evidence indicated that the treatment the child was receiving was
within the bounds of a bona fide medical judgment. While others
may have pursued another course, it is not a court's duty to second
guess a reasoned opinion. The reasoned medical decision must be
made on medical considerations alone and, if a decision is made on
any other basis, doctors should not expect to be shielded from the
courts. The medical profession has a right to certainty. This certainty is provided by definite parameters within which a bonafide
medical judgment can be made. These parameters are not set by
state and federal regulations alone, but also by the values of our
society. It is incumbent upon physicians, as well as state and federal legislators, to put the interest of the child first, as it serves no
useful purpose to require a child and family to undergo needless
months of suffering while legal wrangling over the child's life takes
place. As a society, we must also realize that the handicapped and
their families have special needs that we must all share. The parents of these children are in no way responsible for their condition,
and their misfortune must not be their burden to bear alone.
The medical community urges the implementation of ethics review committees as an answer to government regulation and legislation. Such committees would not be of help to individual children
in urgent need of medical care. Their function would be to review
treatment decisions and create policy on how future cases would be
handled. Needless to say, a number of infants could die before a
discernable policy was established. Review committees will only
provide another shield between doctors and courts. Physicians
must realize that they are not an institution that has been empowered by our society to determine who lives and who dies. Legislation in the area is an attempt to create a reasonableness standard for
doctors regarding life and death decisions of newborns. Their right
to make a reasonable medical judgment will not be impinged. Once
they step beyond that judgment, they are invading the protected
right of individuals. By creating a reasonableness standard for doctors, society will ensure that doctors will be held to the same standard which applies to the rest of society.
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To hold doctors to any less standard would be to allow them to
discriminate based on their notions of which particular human life
is superior. Discrimination by doctors in this area is most unsettling because it is discrimination against life itself.
CharlesA. Phillips
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